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A handful of compossibles
Or: Molinism, libertarian free will, evil, a sin-free heaven, a maximally great
(omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent) God, this being the best of all
possible worlds, heinous suffering, and no-one unjustly suffering are all
compossible.
J. A. Durieux
1  Introduction
Religious world-views tend to make a many claims that non-believers tend to find contradictory.  A well-
known  pair  is  God’s  absolute  goodness  and  the  existence  of  intense  evil.   This  paper  shows  the
compossibility of a largish number of such claims, by a constructive existence proof: a possible world in
which they all are actualised.
This possible world does not reflect my beliefs, and it may well have properties that make it unsuitable as
part of a practical belief system.  All it intends to do is to show compossibility.
2  The world
Let's suppose a certain (maybe infinite) number of potential souls, whom God has given both freedom (i.e.
they rather than God are the ultimate source of their choices) and the right to be actualised.
God Himself is completely free, as there is literally nothing to constrain Him (hence the omnis).  He freely
chooses to be good, just, loving, and so forth - which is why these traits are laudable in Him.
Initially,  souls  are only constrained by Him,  so freedom of  will  merely means that God refrains from
steering.  Many of these souls would never reject Him, but a finite number would, given the chance (they
are free, after all, so their behaviour is not deducible from external factors).  Of this second group, some
would repent under certain circumstances, but others wouldn't.  God, of course, knows this in full detail.
(God's having middle knowledge means that there is a function from situations to creature choices.  This
does not thwart freewill, though, as correlation does not imply causation).
God is glorified in souls freely choosing for Him, and in His love He wants every soul to find eternal bliss,
so His aim is as many as possible of those, that is: all the non-sinners and all those who may repent.  He
intends to grant those a heavenly paradise.
Being perfectly good, God can't be in communion with sinners; being perfectly just, would never allow a
non-sinner other than Himself to suffer; and being perfectly loving, would minimise the suffering even of
sinners.
So what does He do: He plans an initial stage, which He organises so as to make it the best of possible
worlds.
1. All souls are actualised, as denying actualisation to some souls would be unjust.
2. The non-sinners are actualised (as angels) in heaven, but the sinners are actualised (as angels or
humans) in another realm, the universe - so that no non-sinner unjustly suffers under the effects of the
sins of the sinners.
3. The universe is temporal, which takes away the power really to choose - they can only choose “for
now”.  This prevents sinners from really choosing against God: even if they choose against Him now, at
some later point they may still change their choice.
4. All potential repentors do undergo the circumstances (including the call of the Holy Spirit) under which
they will, in fact, repent – thus maximising the number of enjoyers of the infinite bliss He has in store
for repentors.
5. Beyond that, He uses some just measure (is the suffering of repentors worse than the suffering of non-
repentors?).
After this initial stage, the non-repentors are moved to a space outside of all communion with God, and
the repentors, having actualised their repentance, are moved into heaven.
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3  The compossibles
3.1  Molinism and libertarian freewill
A simple model showing how God can have middle knowledge without infringing on the freedom of the
souls is as follows: logically prior to any actualisation, all  souls make a free choice for every possible
situation.  God can use His knowledge of those choices in His logically posterior actualisation decisions.
3.2  Evil and God’s goodness
Obviously, God is good towards all who choose the good – they are in heavenly bliss.  It is part of God’s
goodness to allow souls  to  exist  even if  they choose against  the good.   He even saves all  that are
potentially saveable, by putting them in precisely those circumstances that would make them choose for
the good.
God is also clearly not responsible for any evil, and none who chose the good are subject to any evil.
Those who choose against the good do so in full freedom, and are fully responsible.
3.3  Freewill and fallenness
How can it be given that all men will sin if they have free will?  The answer here is like the marksman who
drew a bull’s eye wherever his bullets had hit the wall: only souls that will sin become men.  And Adam
sinned before procreating, because God chose a soul that would to be Adam.  If He had chosen a soul that
would first have procreated, there would have been a mix of fallen and unfallen people on this earth, and
the unfallen ones would have suffered injustly.
3.4  Freewill and heaven
How can people with free will go to heaven without them endangering heaven’s goodness?  This hinges
on  the  notion  of  choice.   Unless  banned  from  heaven,  souls  have  the  possibility  to  make  true,
eternal/timeless, choices.  God Himself is perfectly good in all freedom because He timelessly chooses to.
This is why His goodness is laudable – because it is His free choice.
Souls at the final judgment will regain this ability, and those that choose for the good will end up in
heaven, and be freely, eternally, good there.  Those who definitely choose against the good will be fully
separated from it, according to their wish.
3.5  Suffering and justice
Souls that choose against the good have chosen evil, and suffering is part of that.  All the good that is still
here is unmerited grace for them.  None who chose the good suffer – they are not in this universe.
(And just a thought: maybe in order to create a situation in which anyone saveable would in fact be
saved, God added zombies to the mix, people without qualia.  Their seeming suffering (even in perdition)
would not be real.)
3.6  Suffering and this being the best of all worlds
While this universe is far from the best of all possible universes, it is the best universe in which repentors
can live, and together with heaven it makes for the best possible world.  For non-repentors, each day here
is a day of unmerited bounty, as some of God's goodness reaches them indirectly through the repentors.
So, doubting that this is the best of all possible worlds would be like inmates doubting that they lived in
the best of all possible worlds – whereas the existence of their prison would precisely be what made the
world optimal.
4  Conclusion
I  am definitely not claiming this scenario as truth – for one thing it makes God improbably anthropo-
morphic; to constitute a proof of compossibility it merely needs to be possible.  In being possible it shows
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the compatibility of Molinsim, libertarian free will, evil, a sin-free heaven, a maximally great (omniscient,
omnipotent and omnibenevolent) God, and this being the best of all possible worlds.  On top of that it
partially explains divine hiddenness: why show oneself to those who would not repent – James 1:6.
One open issue is the problem of those who claim they would much rather not exist.  If that claim is true,
it is unclear why God, knowing their wish through His middle knowledge, still brought them into existence.
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